Adversarial Sequential Decision Making

Part 3: Training Time Defense

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• Introduction: robust supervised learning (linear regression)

• Robustness in offline RL [ZCZS 2021b]

• Robustness in online RL [ZCZS 2021a]

• Experiments

Robust Linear regression

Given a clean dataset $\tilde{D} = (x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^N$, where $x \sim \nu$, $||x|| \leq 1$, $y = x^{\top}w^* + \delta$, with δ being sub-gaussian and $\mathbb{E}[\delta] = 0$, $\mathbb{E}[\delta^2] \leq \gamma^2$

Adversary can arbitrarily corrupt ϵN many pairs from $ilde{D}$

Then, there exists robust linear regression algorithm that returns an estimator \hat{w} , s.t.,

$$\mathbb{E}_{x \sim \nu} (x^{\mathsf{T}} (w^{\star} - \hat{w}))^2 \le c \left(\frac{\gamma^2 \mathsf{poly}(d)}{N} + \gamma^2 \epsilon \right)$$

Is statistically robust RL possible?

Markov Decision Process (MDP)

An MDP $M = (S, A, R, P, \mu_0, \gamma)$ is defined by the following elements:

- the state space *S*.
- the action space A.
- the reward function $R:S imes A o \Delta_{\mathbb{R}}.$
- the transition function $P: S \times A \to \Delta_S$.
- the initial state distribution $\mu_0 \in \Delta_S$.
- the discounting factor $\gamma \in [0,1)$.

Policy and Value

- A (stochastic) <u>policy</u> $\pi : S \to \Delta_A$ specify a strategy of choosing the action based on the current state, i.e. $a_t \sim \pi(s_t)$.
- The <u>value function</u> w.r.t. a policy π is defined as"

$$V^{\pi}(s) = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} r_t | \pi, s_1 = s\right]$$

• The <u>Q function</u> w.r.t. a policy π is defined as:

$$Q^{\pi}(s,a) = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} r_t | \pi, s_1 = s, a_1 = a\right]$$

• The <u>advantage function</u> is defined as: $A^{\pi}(s, a) = Q^{\pi}(s, a) - V^{\pi}(s)$

Optimal Policy Identification (OPI)

• The *objective* of RL is to learn a policy that maximize the expected discounted sum of reward:

$$J(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \mu_0} \Big[V^{\pi}(s) \Big]$$

- The <u>optimal policy</u> is defined as $\pi^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi} J(\pi)$.
- The learning goal is to find a ϵ -optimal policy $\hat{\pi}$, i.e.

$$J(\pi^*) - J(\hat{\pi}) \leq \epsilon.$$

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The ϵ -Contamination model in Offline RL

- 1. A clean dataset $D \sim \mu(s, a)$ of size $T: \{(s_t, a_t, r_t, s_t')\}_{t=1:T}$
- 2. An adversary replace an ϵ fraction of D with arbitrary transitions $(s, a, r, s') \in S \times A \times \mathbb{R} \times S$.
- 3. The learner observes the contaminated dataset and try to find a $poly(\epsilon)$ -optimal policy.

Assumptions

Assumption 1 (Tabular MDP and Exploratory Behavior Policy):

- We assume that both state and action spaces are finite, with size ${\cal S}$ and ${\cal A}$ respectively.
- We also assume that the dataset D is collected by an exploratory behavior policy, such that each (s, a) is visited with some non-zero probability p(s, a).

Finding 1: the statistical limit of robustness in offline RL.

Impossibility Result

Theorem 1. For any given $\epsilon \in (0, 2/SA]$ and exploratory data distribution p(s, a), under ϵ -contamination, no offline RL algorithm can find a better than $SA\epsilon/2$ -optimal policy with probability more than 1/2 on all MDPs.

Key Idea:

- A sparse reward structure: only (s^*, a^*) has positive reward Bernoulli $(SA\epsilon/2)$.
- There exists an (s, a) pair has at most $\frac{T}{SA}$ data points.
- The attacker can concentrate on (s, a), and flip the reward to 1 on ϵT data points of (s, a).
- Then, (s, a) will look as good as Bernoulli $(SA\epsilon)$.

Interpretation of the result

- Unlike high-dimensional robust statistics, here our optimality gap has an *SA* dependence
- Thus robustness of offline rl is not possible for high-dimensional setting, i.e., large-scale MDPs.

Any remedy?

- Q: Can we avoid an explicit SA scaling, i.e., achieve dimensionindependent optimality gap?
- A: On-policy policy gradient!

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The ϵ -Contamination model in Online RL

- 1. At any timestep *t*, the adversary observes (s_t, a_t) and decides whether to supersede the environment to provide any $r_t^{\dagger} \in \mathbb{R}$ and $s_{t+1}^{\dagger} \in S$.
- 2. The adversary cannot contaminate in more than ϵK episodes, K being the total number of interaction episodes.

Remarks:

• Strictly stronger than the adversary model in existing online learning literatures.

The classic Policy Gradient Algorithms

- Policy Gradient [Williams 1992]:
 - 1. Denote

$$d_{\nu}^{\pi}(s) = \left(1 - \gamma\right) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} Pr^{\pi} \left(s_t = s \mid s_0 \sim \nu\right).$$

1. Policy gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta} J(\pi_{\theta}) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \mathbb{E}_{s \sim d_{\mu_0}^{\pi_{\theta}}} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_{\theta}(s)} \Big[\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(a \mid s) A^{\pi_{\theta}}(s, a) \Big].$$

The classic Policy Gradient Algorithms

- Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) [Kakade, 2001]:
 - 1. Fisher Information Matrix:

$$F(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim d_{\mu_0}^{\pi_{\theta}}} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_{\theta}(s)} \Big[\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(a \mid s) \big(\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(a \mid s) \big)^{\mathsf{T}} \Big]$$

2. Gradient ascent: $\theta^{(t+1)} = \theta^{(t)} + \eta F(\theta^{(t)})^{-1} \nabla_{\theta} J(\pi_{\theta}).$

$$w := \arg\min_{w} \mathbb{E}_{s, a \sim d_{\mu_0}^{\pi_{\theta}}} \left(w^{\top} \nabla \ln \pi_{\theta}(a \mid s) - A^{\pi_{\theta}}(s, a) \right)^2$$

Least square from feature $\phi(s, a) := \nabla \ln \pi_{\theta}(a \mid s)$ to $A^{\pi_{\theta}}(s, a)$

Sample-based Filtered NPG (FPG)

- In each iteration t,
 - 1. run $\pi^{(t)}$ to collect a dataset $\left(s_i, a_i, \hat{A}(s_i, a_i)\right)_{i=1:M}$ where $\left(s_i, a_i\right) \sim d_v^{\pi^{(t)}}$.
 - 2. Solve the robust linear regression problem:

$$w^{(t)} = \text{Robust LS}\left((s, a, \hat{A})_{i=1:M}, \phi(s, a) := \nabla \ln \pi_{\theta^t}(a \mid s)\right)$$

Possibly corrupted by adversary already!

3. Policy gradient update:

$$\theta^{(t+1)} = \theta^{(t)} + \eta \ w^{(t)}$$

Robustness of FPG

Assumption 1 (Linear Advantage Function): We assume that there exists a feature map $\phi: S \times A \to \mathbb{R}^d$, such that for any (s, a, π) , we have

 $A^{\pi}(s,a) = \phi(s,a)^{\mathsf{T}} w^{\pi}$, for some $w^{\pi} \in \mathbb{R}^d$.

We assume in addition that, for all (s, a), $\mathbb{E}[r(s, a)] \in [0,1]$, $\mathbb{V}ar[r(s, a)] \leq \sigma^2$ and $||\phi(s, a)|| \leq 1$.

Remarks:

1. Assumption 1 is satisfied in, for example, tabular MDPs and linear MDP.

Robustness of FPG

Assumption 2 (Exploratory Reset Distribution [Agarwal et al. '20a]): With respect to any state-action distribution v, define

$$\Sigma_{\nu} = \mathbb{E}_{s,a \sim \nu} \big[\phi_{s,a} \phi_{s,a}^{\mathsf{T}} \big]$$

and define the <u>relative condition number</u> as

$$\sup_{v \in \mathbb{R}^d} \frac{w^{\mathsf{T}} \Sigma_{d^*} w}{w^{\mathsf{T}} \Sigma_v w} = \kappa, \text{ where } d^*(s, a) = d_{\mu_0}^{\pi^*}(s, a).$$

We assume that κ is finite and small w.r.t. a reset distribution ν available to the algorithm.

Remarks:

- 1. An assumption that alleviate the challenge of exploration.
- 2. We will use the reset distribution ν as our initial distribution μ_0

Finding 2: online RL can be robust.

Robustness of FPG

Theorem 2. Under assumptions 1,2, and under ϵ -contamination there exists a set of hyperparameters agnostic to ϵ , such that FPG with $\operatorname{poly}(d, \frac{1}{\epsilon}, \frac{1}{1-\gamma})$ sample complexity returns a policy $\hat{\pi}$ such that $\mathbb{E}\left[J(\pi^*) - J(\hat{\pi})\right] \leq \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\frac{\kappa}{(1-\gamma)^5}}\epsilon^{1/4}\right).$

Remarks:

• κ can be as small as 1 for a good reset distribution (e.g., ν is an expert demonstration distribution).

Proof of Theorem 2

Lemma 1 (NPG Regret Lemma [Even-Dar et al. '09, Agarwal et al. '20]). Under assumptions 1,2, assume that π_0 is the uniform policy and the iterates $w^{(t)}$ satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}_{s,a\sim d^{(t)}}\left[\left(Q^{\pi(t)}(s,a)-\phi(s,a)^{\mathsf{T}}w^{(t)}\right)^{2}\right]\right] \leq \epsilon_{sta}^{(t)}$$

Then, NPG satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\left(J(\pi^*) - J(\pi^{(t)})\right)\right] \leq \frac{W}{1 - \gamma}\sqrt{\frac{2\log|A|}{T}} + \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\sqrt{\frac{4\kappa\epsilon_{stat}^{(t)}}{\left(1 - \gamma\right)^3}}$$

Proof of Theorem 2

Lemma 2 (Robust linear regression under adaptive ϵ -contamination). For a given iteration t, suppose the adversary corrupt this iteration with contamination level $\epsilon^{(t)}$, then with M large enough it is guaranteed that with high probability,

$$\mathbb{E}_{s,a\sim d^{(t)}}\left[\left(Q^{\pi(t)}(s,a)-\phi(s,a)^{\mathsf{T}}w^{(t)}\right)^{2}\right] \leq O\left(\frac{\sqrt{\epsilon^{(t)}}}{\left(1-\gamma\right)^{2}}\right)$$

• Importantly, note that
$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} e^{(t)} = \epsilon$$
.

• The result follows by plugging Lemma 2 into Lemma 1 and apply Cauchy–Schwarz:

$$\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} (\epsilon^{(t)})^{1/4} \le \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \epsilon^{1/4} = \epsilon^{1/4}$$

Lower bound

Theorem 3. For any algorithm, there exists an MDP such that the algorithm fails to find an $O\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2(1-\gamma)}\right)$ -optimal policy under ϵ -contamination with probability at least 1/2.

• <u>Key idea</u>: an adaptive ε -contamination adversary can with large probability "mimic" a different MDP M', and no policy is more than $O(\frac{\epsilon}{2(1-\gamma)})$ -optimal in both M and M'

M'.

Summary of Theoretical Results

- Under adaptive *e*-contamination,
 - 1. Offline RL suffer a worst-case $O(SA\epsilon)$ optimality gap.
 - 2. FPG can find an $O(\epsilon^{1/4})$ -optimal policy.
 - 3. No algorithm can find better than $O(\epsilon)$ -optimal policy.

- Several lines of related work:
- 1. <u>Adversarial MDPs</u>: stochastic transition *P*, adversarial reward R_k . $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret can be achieved.

[Even-Dar et al. '09, Neu et al. '10, '12, '13, '20, Rosenberg and Mansour '19, Jin et al. '20, Lee et al. '20, ...]

• <u>Impossibility result</u>: sublinear regret impossible when both transition and reward are adversarial at the same time. [Yadkori et al., 2013]

- Several lines of related work:
- 2. <u>Online/non-stationary MDPs</u>: the MDP slowly changes over time with total variation Δ . $O(poly(S, A)\Delta^c T^{1-c})$ regret can be achieved.

[Cheung et al. '19, Ornik and Topcu '19, Ortner et al. '19, Domingues et al. '20, ...]

• Regret bound blows up when the $\Delta = \epsilon T$.

- Several lines of related work:
- 3. <u>Corruption-robust RL</u> [Lykouris et al., 2019]: at most C episodes are adversarial.
 - finds $O(poly(S, A)C/\sqrt{T})$ -optimal policy in tabular MDPs and $O(poly(d)C^2/\sqrt{T})$ in linear MDPs.
 - the bound blows up when $C = \epsilon T$.

- Highlights of our work compared to existing works:
 - 1. We handles both adversarial reward and adversarial transitions.
 - 2. We are the first to provide meaningful guarantees when the amount of change is linear in T.
 - 3. Our algorithm FPG also performs well in practice (to be seen).

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
• Experiments

Finding 3: FPG is also robust in practice.

MuJoCo Continuous Control Benchmarks




Swimmer




Hopper



Half-Cheetah



Walker




Ant



Humanoid


Attack Strategy


- Policy Gradient Methods: $\theta^{(t+1)} = \theta^{(t)} + g^{(t)}$
- Goal: Perturb $\hat{g}^{(t)}$ to point in the $-g^{(t)}$ direction.
- Simple strategy: flip the rewards and multiply by a big constant!
- (ϵ, δ) -attack: Among the M episodes in each PG iteration, perturb the reward to be $r'_t = -\delta r_t$ in ϵM episodes.




 $(0.01,\,100)\text{-}\text{attack}$

TRPO










Happy Cheetah!



References

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Robust Policy Gradient against Strong Data Corruption, Xuezhou Zhang, Yiding Chen, Jerry Zhu, Wen Sun, ICML 2021